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IMAGINING LESBIAN LEGAL THEORY*
Kendall Thomas**
It’s great to be here for this particular occasion to honor the
work of Ruthann Robson, from whom I have, over the course of
many years, learned so much.
First, I’ve learned from her the critical importance of doing
work that is based on and reflects a set of political and ethical com-
mitments to people who live under regimes of domination and ine-
quality.  Her scholarship, to me, is a model of engaged adversary
scholarship.  She has never fallen into the trap, so common to
those of us who are professionalized in the legal academy, of think-
ing that this work does not matter in the lives of real people.
Secondly, through her work, specifically in lesbian legal the-
ory, Ruthann has taught me the importance, to use Shane Phelan’s
phrase, of “getting specific.”1  This sort of global, universal—the
universal gay—term captures, or is supposed to capture, both men
and women and those who see themselves on the very complex
continuum between those two categories.  That specificity is some-
thing that Ruthann’s work teaches to the degree that no other
scholar writing has been able to achieve.
Finally, because she writes in so many different polyvalent dis-
courses, one of the things I’ve learned from Ruthann’s work is the
necessity and the validity of writing in different voices.  She is a
fiction writer.  She is a journalist.  She is a scholar.  The fluidity
with which she has moved across these different discourses in an
effort to tell the stories of lesbians in and outside the law is really
admirable, and this refusal to be locked into the straitjacket of
reigning modes of discourse is incredible.  She understands that,
again, better than any practicing scholar I know.
I want to talk just a few minutes about our contemporary mo-
ment.  Last night, I was privileged to deliver the Ninth Annual Der-
rick Bell Lecture on Race in American Law at NYU Law School,2
and the title of my lecture was Condoleezza Rice and Wanda Jean Al-
* Edited transcription of spoken remarks delivered at the Symposium to Honor
the Work of Professor Ruthann Robson at the City University of New York School of
Law, Nov. 5, 2004.
** Nash Professor of Law, Columbia Law School, and Co-Director, Columbia Law
School Center for the Study of Law and Culture.
1 SHANE PHELAN, GETTING SPECIFIC: POSTMODERN LESBIAN POLITICS (1994).
2 Kendall Thomas, Nash Professor of Law, Columbia Law School, Ninth Annual
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len. You all know who Condoleezza Rice is.  Wanda Jean Allen may
be a name you may not be familiar with.
Wanda Jean Allen was a poor, black, mentally challenged les-
bian, who killed her lover, Gloria Leathers, in the parking lot of a
police station in Oklahoma in 1988.  On January 11, 2001, roughly
ten days before George W. Bush took office, Wanda Jean Allen was
executed.3  There is a remarkable documentary, which I recom-
mend to you, by Liz Garbus, called The Execution of Wanda Jean,4
which follows the last three months of Wanda Jean Allen’s life.  I
understand it is still being screened from time to time on HBO.
I chose the title for the lecture last night because of an essay I
had read that had a really profound effect on me, by someone
most of the people in this room, no doubt, never heard of—a Brit-
ish lyric critic, feminist, and psychoanalytic theorist named Jacque-
line Rose.  Jacqueline Rose, in a series of lectures that were
published in a book called Why War,5 takes up the question of the
relationship between two other figures.  Those figures are Mar-
garet Thatcher and Ruth Ellis.
Margaret Thatcher, as you know, was the first woman to be
elected Prime Minister of Great Britain.  Ruth Ellis was the last wo-
man to be executed in the United Kingdom for the murder of her
lover in the fifties.  Rose brings these two people together because
she is interested in the question of the relationship between wo-
men, power, violence, war, terrorism, and death.  For Rose, Mar-
garet Thatcher presents that question with particular force.  She is
mindful, though, that any discussion of Thatcher that relates spe-
cifically to her as a woman risks sliding into misogyny.  Rose, none-
theless, insists that “something about Thatcher’s place in the
collective imaginary of British culture calls out for an understand-
ing of what it is she releases by dint of being a woman and of the
forms of fantasmatic scenario which she brings into play.”6  Rose
asks, “can [Thatcher’s] re-election [not once, but twice] be used to
understand something about the place of fantasy in our collective
political life?”7  Rose reports on discussions among the British Left,
Lecture on Race in American Society in Honor of Professor Derrick Bell at New York
University School of Law: Condoleezza Rice and Wanda Jean Allen (Nov. 4, 2004).
3 See Allen v. State, 871 P.2d 79 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994), aff’d sub nom. Allen v.
Massie, 202 F.3d 281 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom. Allen v. Okla. Pardon and
Parole Bd., 531 U.S. 1107 (2001).
4 The Execution of Wanda Jean (HBO television broadcast, March 17, 2002).
5 JACQUELINE ROSE, WHY WAR? PSYCHOANALYSIS, POLITICS, AND THE RETURN TO ME-
LANIE KLEIN (1993).
6 Id. at 44.
7 Id.
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which she says came very close to acknowledging the importance of
this question of the relationship, or rather, the place of fantasy, in
our political life.
Rose mentions in particular the father of culture studies in
Britain, Stuart Hall.   Hall says that the challenge for the Left after
Thatcher’s re-election victory is to try to figure out why it was that
although the conservative government was “unpopular in terms of
its policies,” that government had nonetheless “managed to mobil-
ize a new ideological constituency” made up in large part of people
whose vote for the conservative government was a vote against their
own material interests.8  I’m sure that idea resonates with you in
the aftermath of the 2004 national election—a report I saw on
CNN.com revealed that almost one in four people who identified
themselves as gay, lesbian, or bisexual in the exit polls voted for
George W. Bush.9  So Rose’s question is, how is it that unpopular
policies don’t prevent the mobilization of ideological constituen-
cies?  Politics, she writes, are formed not just on the basis of so-
called real majorities, but also on equally real symbolic majorities.
The Left weakens itself politically by failing to take these images
seriously, leaving the important field of symbolic identifications to
the Right.  Rose notes that in her terms, Stuart Hall is arguing here
that politics is not only but also a “matter of fantasies, in which the
way that people ‘imagine’ themselves occupies a crucial place.”10
Thatcherism was only the most recent expression of a political
phenomenon whose history in Britain, at least, went back to the
1930s, when the Left had to ask itself why, in the face of increasing
political oppression, large sections of people, including those who
are most exploited, move not to the left but to the right.  This ques-
tion of political fantasy of images and identifications, it seems to
me, is a necessary prelude to any understanding of how people in
unequal social, legal, and political relations of power can embrace
their inequality, and how people can lick the lash of their domina-
tion.  Since the law in our country plays such a prominent part in
the way people understand themselves politically, it is an important
site for addressing this political question.
And so, I just want very briefly to mark out diagrammatically
how we might understand the regime of death penalty law as a
8 Id. at 44-45.
9 CNN.com, Election 2004 Results, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/
pages/results/states/US/P/00/epolls.0.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2005); see also Chris
Bull, Campaign Notebook—Gays for Bush, http://www.gay.com/news/roundups/pack-
age.html?coll=news_feature&sernum=965&page=2 (last visited Aug. 27, 2005).
10 ROSE, supra note 5, at 45.
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component part in the structure of political fantasy, because the
death penalty continues to be supported by a remarkably high
number of people in the United States.  It is supported indeed to a
remarkably high degree by the populations that are most adversely
effected—the poor and people of color—largely through the con-
struction of images about the death penalty that are articulated
both within the legal system and within the broader culture.  The
“Death Penalty State,” if we can call it that, is a part of the state in
which we have seen an incredible explosion in the prison industrial
complex.  The Death Penalty State is intimately tied, I would sug-
gest, not just to domestic repression, but to the broader project of
the “Killing State” abroad, especially after 9/11.
So, diagrammatically and very quickly, the images of Con-
doleezza Rice and Wanda Jean Allen: two mutually reinforcing vi-
sions of the relationship of women to violence, terrorism, and
death in contemporary American political culture.
Condoleezza Rice is, above all, a citizen, a stateswoman.
Wanda Jean Allen, a criminal convict.  Condoleezza Rice is a subject
of the Killing State.  Wanda Jean Allen is an object of state killing.
Condoleezza Rice is an apologist for lawful violence.  Wanda Jean
Allen is an agent of lawless violence.  Condoleezza Rice, as her title
suggests, is a guardian of national security.  Wanda Jean Allen is a
veritable repository of all that is socially dangerous.  Condoleezza
Rice embodies the embrace of what Randall Kennedy calls “racial
reputation” and the “politics of respectability.”11  Wanda Jean Al-
len, the woman who walked around her house in front of men with
her chest bare, embodies the politics of shame.  Condoleezza Rice,
enlightened post-racial American that she is, is an ethnic figure, so
African-American in her narrative that she tells a story again and
again (usually by focusing on the three-fifths clause of the
Constitution).
African-Americans have become part of our multi-ethnic dem-
ocratic culture. Wanda Jean Allen, at trial, was effectively con-
structed by the prosecution as a black male.  Race was used for
homophobic purposes in her trial.  Wanda Jean Allen represents
the fall back into race.  Condoleezza Rice, not withstanding the
speculations some of you have no doubt read on the Internet, is
putatively heterosexual.  Wanda Jean Allen is perversely
homosexual.
I submit to you that in a few years, we are going to be trying to
11 RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 18 (1997).
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make sense of the ways in which, after Lawrence,12 “racialized”
figures can be used in the service of homophobic projects.  The
fact that Lawrence has been decided by no means entails—this is a
point so obvious that I feel embarrassed saying it—the end of insti-
tutional homophobia.
Another incredible feature of this whole story, particularly be-
cause these women are black, is that Rice is a saint; she is a Sunday
school teacher; and Allen, even though she repudiates her lesbian-
ism and embraces Christianity because her life is at stake in bible-
belt country, is a sinner.  These figures, however, Condoleezza Rice
and Wanda Jean Allen, quite obviously introduce the question of
race into the paradigm that Jacqueline Rose develops around Mar-
garet Thatcher and Ruth Ellis, and explicitly raise the question of
sexuality.
One of the spaces that Ruthann’s work has opened up is the
need to think about questions of race, sexuality, and gender to-
gether, not because they are, in Crenshaw’s term, “intersectional,”
but because they are inter-articulated and embedded in one an-
other.13  As Judith Butler puts it, race, gender, and sexuality are
lived in the modality of one another, and, as we see, although the
word race was never mentioned in Wanda Jean Allen’s trial,
gendered and sexualized stereotypes were.14  She was the man in
the relationship.  Her partner whom she killed was the woman.
Gender and sexuality can operate as part of a racial project.  Once
we see that, we begin to see the connection between the practice of
state killing and the institution of the Killing State.  After Septem-
ber 11, that’s particularly crucial because we begin to see the ways
in which the death penalty in the United States, as a domestic pro-
ject—racist, homophobic, and misogynist—is intimately connected
to the international work of the new Killing State, which the
United States has become.  This thoroughly racialized project,
which uses homophobia, creates the conditions of possibility for
the extension of state killing abroad.  A killing which, as you know,
has historically been and will no doubt for some time well into the
future, remain the liquidation of people who themselves are
predominantly poor and black or brown.
This is the new unilateral order, stitched together in a seam-
12 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
13 Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Femi-
nist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139.
14 JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY
(1990).
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less political imagery.  People accept Wanda Jean Allen at home
and Condoleezza Rice abroad because both underwrite a fantasy of
security.  We fight them over there so we don’t have to fight them
here.  But we kill them here and elsewhere.
